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Abstract
We analyze the capacity choice of ﬁrms under different time structures in a mixed oligopoly
market, in which ﬁrms decide not only production quantities but also capacity scales. We show that
the public ﬁrm never chooses excess capacity, while the private ﬁrm never chooses under capacity
under all possible strategic environments.
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1. Introduction
Mixed oligopolies are common in many countries. Oil industries, heavy manufacturing
industries, telecommunications or tourism industry are good examples of mixed
oligopolies. In a typical situation of mixed oligopoly, where at least one ﬁrm is public
(non-proﬁt maximizer) and competing with private ﬁrms, the main focus of the study in
the literature so far was to see welfare implications as the number of ﬁrms changes in the
industry(see Cremer etal., 1989; De Fraja and Delbono,1990; Nett,1993; Anderson et al.,
1997). Very few models have focused on the impact of sequential choice of capacity and
quantity (or price) by the competing ﬁrms on the outcomes in a mixed oligopoly
environment. In contrast, in the literature of oligopoly the issue of choosing over (excess)
capacity or under capacity from a strategic point of view by the competing ﬁrms in
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There exists an extensive literature addressing this issue under private oligopoly
framework (i.e. when all ﬁrms are private, i.e. pure proﬁt maximizers) Spence (1977);
Dixit (1980), Saloner (1985), Tirole (1988); Basu and Singh (1990) and among many
others. However, not many studies on this issue have been done in the framework of a
mixed oligopoly where the same question is equally applicable. In this paper, we would
like to ﬁll up that gap in the literature.
1 The results regarding excess or under capacity in a
private oligopoly framework varies widely and it very much depends on modeling
environment; for example see Dixit (1980); Bulow et al. (1985) for conﬂicting results. In
view to that here we would like to ﬁnd out how the outcomes in a mixed oligopoly
framework stand in comparison to those ﬁndings under private oligopoly.
We analyze the capacity choice of ﬁrms under different time structures in a mixed
oligopoly market, in which ﬁrms decide not only production quantities but also capacity
levels. For simplicity, we assume there is one public ﬁrm and one private ﬁrm. The public
ﬁrm maximizes social surplus (welfare), whereas the private ﬁrm maximizes its own
proﬁt. We consider a three-stage game of four different time structures. In the ﬁrst two
time structures, capacities are chosen sequentially (alternatively by the public and the
private ﬁrm), and then quantities are chosen simultaneously, where as in the last two time
structures, capacities are chosen simultaneously, and the quantities are chosen sequentially
(alternatively by the public and the private ﬁrm). Under these time structures, we show that
the public ﬁrm never chooses excess capacity, while the private ﬁrm never chooses under
capacity under all possible strategic environments. These results complement the ﬁndings
of a private oligopoly model and distinguish the role of a public ﬁrm when it competes
with a proﬁt maximizing private ﬁrm.
2. Model
We consider a mixed duopoly market. Two ﬁrms are operating in a homogeneous
good market where the inverse demand is given by
p ZaKQ ZaKðqa CqbÞ; aO0 (1)
where p is market price, Q is total output and qi denotes the output of ﬁrm i (Za,b).
Firm a is a proﬁt-maximizing private ﬁrm, and ﬁrm b is a public ﬁrm maximizing the
social surplus (welfare) which is the summation of the consumer surplus and the ﬁrms’
proﬁts.
The ﬁrms have different technologies, represented by the cost function, Ci(qi,xi), where
qi and xi are the production quantity and capacity of ﬁrm i, respectively.
For simplicity, following Vives (1986); Horiba and Tsutsui (2000); Nishimori and
Ogawa (2004), we specify the cost function as
Ciðqi;xiÞ Zmiqi CðqiKxiÞ
2: (2)
1 Very recent work along this line is done by Nishimori and Ogawa (2004), and previously in the context of
entry by Ware (1986). The game with endogenous timing of choosing quantities in a mixed oligopoly was studied
by Pal (1998).
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choice. Excess capacity or under capacity would result in inefﬁciency. Under this
U-shaped cost function, the long-run average cost is actually minimized when quantity
equals production capacity, i.e. qiZxi. One can contrast this type of cost structure with the
type of cost structure which is more frequently observed in the literature addressing
sequential capacity and quantity choice in oligopoly models.
2 In the literature, more often
production beyond planned capacity is considered to be extra costly than production
within the capacity-limit chosen before. Although holding idle capacity is itself costly, but
in most cases cost of having excess capacity and under capacity is not considered exactly
symmetry. Here, we assume a cost structure where the cost of having excess or under
capacity is symmetric.
We assume ma!mb; that is, ﬁrm a can produce more efﬁciently than ﬁrm b at the
efﬁcient production-capacity level.
3 We also assume aKmbRð830=247ÞðmbKmaÞ such
that capacities and quantities are non-negative in all the cases we consider.
The objective function of ﬁrm a is given by
pa ZpqaKmaqaKðqaKxaÞ
2; (3)






2/2 is the consumer surplus.
2.1. The different time structures
We consider ﬁrms’ choice of capacity in the following three-stage games:
Case 1: The public ﬁrm b chooses capacity ﬁrst, then the private ﬁrm a chooses
capacity, and in the third stage both ﬁrms choose quantity simultaneously.
Case 2: The private ﬁrm a chooses capacity ﬁrst, then the public ﬁrm b chooses
capacity, and in the third stage both ﬁrms choose quantity simultaneously.
Case 3: Both ﬁrms choose capacity simultaneously in the ﬁrst stage, then the public
ﬁrm b chooses quantity in the second stage, and the private ﬁrm a chooses quantity in
the third stage.
Case 4: Both ﬁrms choose capacity simultaneously in the ﬁrst stage, then the private
ﬁrm a chooses quantity in the second stage, and the public ﬁrm b chooses quantity in
the third stage.
2 The more frequently used cost function (or a variant of it) in the literature is: Ciðqi;xiÞZðmiCwiÞxiCðmiC
wiCDmiÞðqiKxiÞZðmiCwiÞqiCDmiðqiKxiÞifqiOxi; Ci(qi,xi)ZmiqiCwixi if qi%xi where wi marginal cost of
capacity and Dmi is the extra cost of producing the output beyond the planned capacity.
3 Note that maRmb will yield zero proﬁt for the private ﬁrm.
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We look for subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of each of the sequential game.
Case 1. Following the standard equilibrium concept, we solve the model from the third
stage.


















In the second stage, ﬁrm a takes their quantity level in the third stage into account and
wants to maximize its proﬁt by choosing its capacity. It takes the capacity chosen by ﬁrm b
in stage one as given.
maxxapa ZðaKqaKqbÞqaKmaqaKðqaKxaÞ
2
s.t. (7) and (8).














In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrm b knows that its decision regarding the capacity level affects ﬁrm
a’s capacity decision in the second stage and their output decisions in the third stage. Thus,








s.t. (9), (10) and (11).


















Now, comparing (13) with (14) and (12) with (15) we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the three-stage game in which public ﬁrm chooses its capacity before the
private ﬁrm’s choice of capacity and then both choose quantity simultaneously, the private
ﬁrm chooses excess capacity, while the public ﬁrm chooses under capacity.
To maximize the social surplus, it is desirable for a public ﬁrm to have total outputs
provided by the private ﬁrm since the private ﬁrm is more efﬁcient. This implies that the
public ﬁrm tries to make the private ﬁrm produce more while it produces less. Since
capacity is strategic substitute and there is a positive relationship between the capacity
level of private ﬁrm and its output level, the public ﬁrm can improve the social surplus by
reducing its own capacity so that the private ﬁrm increases its capacity and quantity. On
the other hand, enlarging the production share in the market is desirable for the private
ﬁrm. Hence, the private ﬁrm ends up choosing excess capacity while the public ﬁrm
chooses under capacity.
4
Case 2. Following the same procedure, we can get (7) and (8) again. Then in the second
stage, the public ﬁrm chooses capacity to maximize social surplus:
4 The result is very similar to the key result in Nishimori and Ogawa (2004).







s.t. (7) and (8).














And in the ﬁrst stage, the private ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization problem is:
maxxapa ZðaKqaKqbÞqaKmaqaKðqaKxaÞ
2
s.t. (16), (17) and (18).







It means that the larger the private ﬁrm’s capacity is, the more its proﬁt. Hence, the
private ﬁrm will choose capacity large enough so that the public ﬁrm will choose no
capacity, xbZ0. To make the public ﬁrm choose no capacity, the private ﬁrm’s capacity















In the ﬁrst stage, the private ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁt subject to (19), (20) and (21). It is














Thus, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. In the three-stage game in which the private ﬁrm chooses its capacity
before the public ﬁrm’s choice of capacity and then both choose quantity simultaneously,
the public ﬁrm chooses no capacity and produces positive quantity, while the private ﬁrm
chooses excess capacity.
The result is similar to that in Case 1. The difference is that the public ﬁrm chooses no
capacity, which is reasonable. Because the public ﬁrm chooses its capacity after the
private ﬁrm makes it choice of capacity and since it (the public ﬁrm) always tries to make
the private ﬁrm produce more while it produces less, it ends up choosing no capacity.


















Thus, Proposition 3 follows:
Proposition 3. In the three-stage game in which both ﬁrms choose capacity
simultaneously in the ﬁrst stage, and then the public ﬁrm chooses quantity followed by
the private ﬁrm, the public ﬁrm chooses exact capacity while the private ﬁrm chooses
excess capacity.
The economic intuition of this result is different from the previous ones. First of all,
since both ﬁrms choose capacity simultaneously there is no commitment advantage in
the ﬁrst stage; and as a result, unlike previous cases, there is no leadership advantage
while choosing capacities. But due to strategic reason, i.e. to have a larger share of
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choosing their capacities.
5 However, this opens up the possibility of ending up with
excess capacity later in the quantity choosing stage. Now, the ﬁrm moving in stage two
(in this case the public ﬁrm) can adjust its choice of quantity (using limited leadership
advantage) so that it does not end up in costly excess capacity. But, the ﬁrm moving in
the third stage (in this case the private ﬁrm) being a follower has to take the quantity
choice of the leader as given and produce (constrained) optimal quantity in response to
that. Naturally, this does not match with its previous capacity choice. Now, because of
higher capacity choice in the ﬁrst stage (due to the aggressive behavior), it eventually
ends up with excess capacity.

















Thus, Proposition 4 follows:
Proposition 4. In the three-stage game in which both ﬁrms choose capacity
simultaneously in the ﬁrst stage, and then the private ﬁrm chooses quantity followed by
the public ﬁrm, public ﬁrm chooses under capacity, while private ﬁrm chooses exact
capacity.
Here, the intuition is similar to the previous proposition up to a point. It is the
same up until the second stage of the game. But since the objective of the public ﬁrm
is different from the private ﬁrm, the end result gets different in the third stage. Since
the objective of the public ﬁrm is welfare maximization (as opposed to proﬁt), despite
being a follower at stage three, its best response quantity still exceeds its initial
capacity choice.
4. Choice of excess capacity or under capacity
We summarize ﬁrms’ choice of capacity into Table 1.
This leads us to the main result of our analysis.
5 Note that in case of quantity competition ﬁrms’ proﬁts are increasing in their own quantities; moreover,
quantities are strategic substitutes. Hence, the aggressive behavior arises in the capacity choice stage.
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sequentially, the public ﬁrm never chooses excess capacity, while the private ﬁrm never
chooses under capacity in the equilibrium.
If both ﬁrms move simultaneously in the capacity choice stage, neither has
commitment advantage; then the leader ﬁrm in the quantity choice stage uses its
limited leadership advantage to choose quantity which is exactly equal to its capacity
scale. This results in exact capacity choice for the second stage leader. In all the other
cases, the private ﬁrm chooses excess capacity while the public chooses under
capacity. The economic intuition is that the proﬁt-maximizing private ﬁrm wants to
build over capacity so that it can produce more, which is what the public ﬁrm hopes
since the private ﬁrm is more efﬁcient and as a consequence to this the public ﬁrm
ends up choosing under capacity.
5. Concluding remarks
Finally, we point out that in almost all situations ﬁrms do not prefer to choose capacity
simultaneously and then choose quantity simultaneously. This case has been studied by
Nishimori and Ogawa (2004). Using their results
6, we can calculate that social surplus and
private ﬁrm’s proﬁt. The results are: SSZð1=2ÞðaKmbÞ2Cð73=49ÞðmbKmaÞ2; and paZ
2(mbKma)
2. We check that the private ﬁrm’s proﬁt is strictly less than the corresponding
expressions in all four cases considered here. Social surplus is strictly less than the
corresponding expressions in Cases 1, 3 and 4. It is also less than in Case 2 when
ð830=247ÞðmbKmaÞ%aKmb%ð22=3ÞðmbKmaÞ (Table 2).
In an environment of mixed oligopoly, Pal (1998) demonstrated that for two time
periods all ﬁrms (including 1 public and NS1 private ﬁrms) producing simultaneously
in the same time period cannot be sustained as a SPNE outcome. As far as the order
of moves in a mixed oligopoly where the ﬁrms ﬁrst choose the timing for choosing
their capacities or quantities, our results are consistent with Pal’s result. However,
there is no study about endogenous order of moves in a mixed oligopoly where
Table 1
Choice of capacity under different time structures
Case Public ﬁrm Private ﬁrm
1 Under capacity Excess capacity
2 Under capacity, no capacity Excess capacity
3 Exact capacity Excess capacity
4 Under capacity Exact capacity
6 In Nishimori and Ogawa (2004), the public ﬁrm’s capacity scale and quantity level are xbZaK2maK3mb
andqbZðaK2maK3mbÞCð1=7ÞðmbKmaÞ, respectively. However, their calculation is not correct. The correct
result should be xbZaC2maK3mb and qbZðaC2maK3mbÞCð1=7ÞðmbKmaÞ.
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strategic variables. This is a direction for future research.
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